The Sex Discrimination Act 1975, the Race Relations Act 1976 and the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 all expressly apply to a contract worker (SDA 1975, s.9, RRA 1976 s.7 and Disability Discrimination Act 1995 s.12 ).

A worker who is supplied to a "principal" (who in loose terms might be thought of as the "employer") by an employment agency or other third party technically remains an employee of the agency for the purposes of the anti-discrimination legislation (see notes at Employee/definition of ). The legislation noted above ensures that even though the worker is thus technically not an employee of the "principal" nevertheless he (or she) will have rights against a "principal" who is guilty of unlawful discrimination against him (or her).

Employment agencies themselves are covered by Sex Discrimination Act 1975 s.15 and Race Relations Act 1976 s.14 which make it unlawful for an agency to discriminate against a person in the terms on which the agency offers to provide any of its services, or by refusing or deliberately omitting to provide any of its services, or in the way it provides any of its services.

For notes on the Equality Act, in force from 1st October 2010 go to our sister website on the Equality Act 2010 at www.equalityact.co.uk.

See also notes at Definitions and interpretation/contract worker and/or Employment Agencies/2003 regulations and/or at Sex discrimination/vicarious liability of employers and principals ..

The legislation provides that it is unlawful for a "principal" to discriminate against persons who are "employed not by the principal himself but by another person who supplies them under a contract made with the principal" (this is the wording used in SDA 1975, s.9 and RRA 1976 s.7. Slightly different wording is used in DDA 1995 s.12 which defines a "principal" as "a person ("A") who makes work available for doing by individuals who are employed by another person who supplies them under a contract made with A").

Just because the worker concerned has rights against the "principal" it does not mean that he or she does not also have similar rights against his or her employer (ie normally the employment agency). He or she may have rights against both (see Hanbury & Brook Street Bureau v EDS Ltd EAT 2001 EAT/128/00 on 29th March 2001 and Sex Discrimination Act 1975 s.82.).

Sex discrimination examples include BP Chemicals Ltd v Gillick and Roevin Management Services Ltd 1995 IRLR 128, EAT and Hanbury & Brook Street Bureau v EDS Ltd EAT 2001 EAT on 29th March 2001, not reported). Another example is a case in which it was held that a female worker who was supplied to her principal by an employment agency and who was not allowed back to work after taking maternity leave could have a cause of action against the principal (see Patefield v Belfast City Council 2000 IRLR 664, CA, Northern Ireland).

A useful racial discrimination example, is that of a case in which Harrods, the Knightsbridge store required employees of concessionaires operating in the store to be approved by the store. The legislation was held to be wide enough to make Harrods liable for discrimination even though the affected workers were employees of the concessionaire ( Harrods Ltd v Remick CA 1998 ICR 156, CA).

A refusal or deliberate omission by an employment agency to provide its services to a person on race or sex related grounds is specifically made unlawful (Race Relations Act 1976 s.14(1)(b) and Sex Discrimination Act 1975 s.15(1)(b)). The EAT has held that "services" for this purposes includes carrying out a risk assessment properly required by the end-user employer client of the agency in relation to a prospective worker who was pregnant. Therefore the agency was in breach of SDA 15(1)(b) by failing to carry out a risk assessment in respect of a woman who, as a result, did not get the job she was interested in. Although the failure was not a "refusal" it amounted to a "deliberate omission" (see Brocklebank v Silveira, EAT on 11th January 2006).

A disability discrimination example is Abbey Life Assurance Co Ltd v Tansell & anor CA 2000 ICR 789, Court of Appeal on 6th April 2000 in which the Court of Appeal held that a wide "purposive" interpretation should be given to the definition of "principal".

The Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) published a report in 1995 on its first ever formal investigation into the recruitment practices of an employment agency. This resulted in the issue of a non-discrimination notice against the agency concerned "to ensure that discriminatory practices ceased and to give the Commission an opportunity to monitor developments in future". The report contained recommendations which apply to employment agencies generally.